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ARTISTS'RIGHTS: SHOULD MARYLAND GRANT 
MORAL RIGHTS? 
Eric C. Schneidert 
Artists in the United States who sell their works without contrac-
tually reserving any rights in the same currently enjoy only lim-
iied rights under federal copyright laws to exercise continuing 
control over such works. The author assesses the shortcomings of 
copyright protection in comparison with the protection afforded 
artists' so-called "moral rights" by many foreign jurisdictions, in 
particular France and Germany. "Moral rights" legislation has 
been introduced unsuccessfully in the United States both on the 
federal level and before the Maryland General Assembly. The 
author examines the draftsmanship and constitutionality of the 
proposed Maryland legislation and advises its adoption with rec-
ommended changes. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A work of art, once the artist sells it, has little more protection from 
destruction than a toy, an automobile or any other piece of personal 
property. With few exceptions,l the purchaser may alter, mutilate or de-
stroy the work of art at will commensurate with his ownership rights in 
the artwork as personal property.2 Bills have been introduced before the 
Maryland General Assembly and the United States Congress which, if 
passed, would give artists continuing rights in their works of art. 3 This 
t Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A., University of 
Connecticut, 1959; LL.B., University of California, Hastings School of Law, 1962; 
LL.M., New York University, 1968; President, Maryland Lawyers for the Arts. 
1. Some protection exists under a combination of common law doctrine and statutory 
authority. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text; see also Comment, Toward 
Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of Existing Ameri-
can Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539 (1972). 
2. Furthermore, prior to the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 
(codified at 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-810 (1977)), the additional rights to reproduce and 
publish a work of art were presumed to be conveyed to the purchaser as well, unless 
there was an express reservation of these rights or unless a court could find an im-
plied reservation. P. Nolan, All Rights Not Reserved After the First Sale, 23 COpy-
RIGHT SOCIETY OF U.S.A. BULLETIN 76, 76-77 (1975-76). Under the Copyright 
Act of 1976, the sale of the artwork does not automatically transfer all copyrights to 
the purchaser. See infra notes 52-53. 
3. The Maryland Art Preservation Act, S. 233 (1985), received an unfavorable report 
from the Maryland Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on February 7, 1985. In 
its latest form, proposed bill S. 458 (1986), sponsored by State Senator Lapides, was 
assigned to the Maryland Senate Economic and Environmental Affairs Committee, 
where it was disapproved on March 18, 1986. See Appendix I (proposed state bill). 
On the federal level, the proposed Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986, 
S. 2796, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy, was 
referred to the Senate Committee on Judiciary on September 9, 1986, and subse-
quently referred to the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, on 
September 30, 1986, where it "died" without report. A similar amendment, H.R. 
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article explores the continuing rights that artists presently have in sold 
works of art and evaluates the need for additional legislation to ensure 
such rights. 
II. ARTISTS' RIGHTS UNDER PRESENT LAW 
An artist's continuing rights in his work of art after its initial sale 
are generally referred to as "moral rights."4 This phrase is taken directly 
from a concept of protection available to artists in many European and 
Latin American countries.5 Moral rights are divided into five classifica-
tions: (1) the right to claim authorship, (2) the right to prevent others 
from being named as author, (3) the right to prevent others from attrib-
uting one's authorship to work one did not create, (4) the right to prevent 
others from using one's work or name in a way that reflects on one's 
professional standing, and (5) the right to preserve the work from altera-
tion or mutilation. 
The concept of moral rights has not been recognized judicially in the 
United States.6 Thus, in the United States, unlike in Europe, an artist 
must specifically reserve these rights in the contract of sale.7 Courts in 
5722, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), introduced by Representative Edward Markey, 
was referred on October 16, 1986, to the Ho~se Committee on Judiciary, where it 
"died" without report or further referral. See Appendix II (federal bill). 
4. The term "moral rights" is a literal translation of the French "droit moral" and the 
use of the term has been criticized as inaccurate and misleading. See Diamond, 
Legal Protection for the 'Moral Rights' of Authors and Other Creators, 68 TRADE-
MARK REP. 244 n.3 (1978). It is suggested that the term "moral right" is too am-
biguous in that it means different things in different civil law countries and is thus a 
misleading term. J. Treece, American Law Analogues to the Author's "Moral 
Right", 16 AM. J. CaMP. L. 487,505-06 (1968). This article will concentrate on the 
two primary models of France and Germany. 
5. Gantz, Protecting Artists' Moral Rights: A Critique of the California Art Preservation 
Act as A Model For Statutory Reform, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 873, 874 (1981). 
6. See Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987) (court noted 
that no jurisdiction in United States has recognized moral right as such and refused 
to adopt principle that an author has a moral right to prevent alterations by a co-
author); Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); Granz 
v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952); Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 
(7th Cir. 1947); Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 
813 (1949); Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 
N.Y.S.2d 575 (1948); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 172 USPQ 541 (Cal. Super. 
1972); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
In Gilliam, the court found that the presentation of an edited version of the 
plaintiff's work was a mutilation of that work and thus a violation of section 43 of 
the Lanham Act. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24-25. On the question of moral rights, 
however, the court noted, "American copyright law, as presently written, does not 
recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since the law 
seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors." [d. at 
24. 
7. Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947) (court refused to apply 
the "civil law" of foreign countries to imply moral rights into a contract of sale). 
Professor Melville Nimmer notes, however, 
[T]he time honored judicial practice of distilling new wine in old bot-
tles has resulted in an increasing accretion of case law which in some de-
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the United States have afforded artists some non-contractual continuing 
rights in their work, however, by combining traditional legal concepts 
with existing legislation. 8 
The primary legislation protecting continuing economic rights of 
artists in their works is the Federal Copyright Act of 19769 (the "1976 
Copyright Act"). It grants to an artist or the owner of a copyright cer-
tain economic rights, but not rights pertaining to artistic reputation or 
the integrity of the work of art; hence, it does not provide as broad a 
range of protection as that afforded by the European concepts of moral 
rights. to Even so basic a right as the right to be known as the author of a 
work is not protected under the 1976 Copyright Act unless the author 
has been careful to place such a right in the contract of sale. 11 Copyright 
law does, however, protect an author t2 in the event that someone else 
claims to be the author of his work even absent express contractual lan-
guage to that effect t3 and may, to some extent, prevent the alteration or 
mutilation of a work of art.t4 
gree accords the substance of moral rights either under copyright, or 
under other conventional and respectable labels such as unfair competi-
tion, defamation, invasion of privacy or breach of contract. It may not be 
said that this development has brought to American authors moral rights 
protection in the full bloom of its European counterpart. 
2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.21[B) (1987). 
8. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text. 
9. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1977». 
10. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 8.21[B). 
11. Copyright law gives no remedy for failure to place the author's name on a work. 
This right is only protected through a breach of contract cause of action when the 
contract has clearly provided for this right. See Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 
522 (7th Cir. 1947); Lake v. Universal Pictures Co., 95 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Cal. 
1950); Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 183, 122 N.Y.S. 206 (1910). But 
see Bajpayee v. Rothermich, 53 Ohio App. 117,372 N.E.2d 817 (1977) (defendant, 
who used an article written by plaintiff in a way which indicated it was defendant's 
work, held liable for tort of invasion of plaintiff's right to publicity). 
12. The 1976 Copyright Act does not require that a work be registered with the Copy-
right Office to initially secure a copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1977), but registration 
of the copyright is important since it is a prerequisite to the bringing of any action 
for infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1977). 
13. See 17 U.S.c. §§ 501-510 (1977). 
14. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 8.21[C][I) (discussing Gilliam v. American 
Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), where the right to prevent distortion 
or truncation of a work was, for the first time, afforded copyright protection). 
When the assignment or license of the work is silent on the subject of alteration, 
according to Gilliam, unauthorized changes in the work that are so extensive as to 
impair the integrity of the original work constitute copyright infringement of repro-
duction and performance rights. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 21. If the "alteration" of the 
work can be brought under the right of a copyright holder to prepare derivative 
works they may be protected by 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1977). Section 107 of the 1976 
Copyright Act does, however, provide for "fair use of a copyrighted work ... for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ... scholarship or 
research .... " 17 U.S.c. § 107 (1977). A recent case upheld the right of an author 
to prevent alteration under the Copyright Act. See Midway Mfg. v. Artic Int'l, 
Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1013-1014 (7th Cir. 1983) (sped-up video game created by 
licensee with circuit boards supplied by defendant was derivative work based upon 
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The first Congress passed copyright legislation 1 5 pursuant to its 
power under the United States Constitution "to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts, by securing for limited time to authors and inven-
tors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."16 
This legislation was amended occasionally before 1909. 17 The 1909 legis-
lation (the "1909 Copyright Act") remained relatively unchanged until 
1976, when Congress enacted the most recent Copyright Act, which took 
effect on January 1, 1978}8 
Before January 1, 1978, a common law copyright protected a work 
from the instant of its creation. 19 If the work was never published, the 
copyright remained in its author in perpetuity.20 Before the work was 
published the artist could obtain a federal statutory copyright by 
registration.21 
Once the work was published, however, the common law copyright 
and, if obtained by registration, the federal statutory copyright were lost 
by operation of law.22 After the first publication, the author had statu-
tory copyrights in the work only if he complied with the statutory re-
quirements of the 1909 Copyright Act by having published the work with 
a proper copyright notice.23 Registration after publication was not nec-
copyrighted videogame, and defendant's sale of circuit boards that sped up rate of 
play of plaintiff's video games was infringement of plaintiff's copyrights). There is a 
highly disputed area of case law on the issue of whether state moral rights legisla-
tion is preempted by federal copyright law. See infra notes 136-194 and accompa-
nying text. 
15. 17 U.S.C.A., Explanation, vi to viii (1977). 
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
17. 35 Stat. 1075, ch. 320 (effective July 1, 1909). 
18. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (October 19, 1976) (effective January 1, 1978). 
19. Before the 1976 Copyright Act, "the American law of copyright had been the sub-
ject of a dichotomy between federal and state law. Unpublished works were auto-
matically protected by state law, referred to somewhat inaccurately [because in 
some states protection was based on statute] as common law copyright. Such pro-
tection began at the moment of creation." 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 2.02 (1987). 
20. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 19, at § 4.03. This was according to state "common law" 
copyright. Under the 1909 Copyright Act, protection for unpublished works was 
for a limited time. See Marx v. United States, 96 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1938) ("It 
would appear that Congress intended that the time limit ... should have application 
to all copyrights secured by the act. . .. [W]orks of which copies are not produced 
for sale [are protected for twenty-eight years from] the date of deposit."). 
21. Section 12 of the 1909 Copyright Act. This, however, did not include unpublished 
books, periodicals, maps, reproductions of works of art, prints and labels and sound 
recordings. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 7. 16[A][2][c][i). 
22. Public Affairs Assocs. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 270 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated, 369 
U.S. III (1962) (court found record insufficient for appellate review); Hill and 
Range Songs, Inc. v. London Records, Inc., 142 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. 1955); 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 347 (1908) ("Thus, when a work is pub-
lished in print, the owner's common-law rights are lost, and, unless the pUblication 
be in accordance with the requirements of the statute, the statutory right is not 
secured. "). 
23. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899); National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett 
Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1951); Metro Associated Servs., 
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essary to create the statutory copyright, but section 13 ofthe 1909 Copy-
right Act required that once a statutory copyright had been obtained by 
publication with notice, the author "shall promptly deposit" copies and a 
registration claim.24 If the holder of the statutory copyright did not 
comply with this requirement, he did not lose the copyright but would be 
prevented from bringing an infringement action until he had complied 
with section 13.25 Under the 1909 Copyright Act, copyright holders 
were protected for twenty-eight years from the date of first publication 
and could obtain an additional twenty-eight years upon application for 
renewal.26 Under the 1976 Copyright Act, the creator of any copy-
rightable work27 created after January 1, 1978 obtains the copyright in 
that work the moment it is fixed in a tangible medium from which it can 
be read or visually perceived, either directly or with the aid of a machine 
or otherwise.28 If he publishes the work with proper copyright notice, 
the copyright is retained without the necessity of registration.29 The art-
ist may lose his rights under the 1976 Copyright Act if he publishes the 
work without placing proper notice on it.30 The Act prescribes31 that the 
general form of notice shall consist either of the word "copyright," the 
abbreviation "Copr.," or the symbol © accompanied by the year of the 
first publication of the work and the name of the copyright proprietor. 32 
For a work of art the Act allows a shorter form of notice consisting of © 
accompanied by the initials, monogram, mark or symbol of the copyright 
proprietor, "affixed in such a manner and location as to give reasonable 
notice of the claim of copyright."33 
Inc. v. Webster City Graphic, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 224, 234 (N.D. Iowa 1953) (plain-
tiff lost in suit for copyright infringement where plaintiff had not complied with 
statute relating to notice of copyright). 
24. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 7. 16[A][2][b]. 
25. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939) ("prompt deposit" 
should not be a condition subsequent which if not satisfied resulted in destruction of 
the copyright); Primcot Fabrics v. Kleinfab Corp., 368 F. Supp. 482, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 
1974) (plaintiff's failure to register design copyright until after defendant published 
was not fatal to infringement cause of action); Pittway Corp. v. Reliable Alarms 
Mfg., 164 U.S.P.Q. 379 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). 
26. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 9.0l[C]. 
27. Copyright protection is given to "original works of authorship," including without 
limitation, "(I) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying 
words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and 
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pic-
tures and other audio-visual works; and (7) sound recordings," which are "fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they 
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with 
the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). 
28. 17 U.S.c. §§ 102, 302(a) (1980). 
29. 17 U.S.c. § 401 (1982). 
30. For a definition of "publication," see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982), quoted infra at text 
accompanying note 46. 
31. 17 U.S.c. § 401 (1982). 
32. 17 U.S.C. § 401(b)(I), (2) (1982). 
33. 17 U.S.c. § 401(b)(3), (c) (1982). 
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The proper interpretation of this statutory language is the subject of 
debate. Some argue that the sort of notice required must be on the front 
of a work of art, whereas others suggest that an artist's signature alone is 
enough.34 The reluctance of artists to use federal copyright law protec-
tion has been attributed to insufficient knowledge of copyright generally, 
and the perception that such protection requires defacement of their 
work. 35 The failure to attach notice, however, may be excused and the 
artist will retain the copyright if: 
(1) the notice has been omitted from no more than a rela-
tively small number of copies ... distributed to the public; or 
(2) registration for the work has been made before or is 
made within five years after the publication without notice, and 
a reasonable effort is made to add notice to all copies . . . that 
are distributed to the public in the United States after the omis-
sion has been discovered; or 
(3) the notice has been omitted in violation of an express 
requirement in writing that, as a condition of the copyright 
owner's authorization of the public distribution of copies ... , 
they bear the prescribed notice. 36 
Even when a work is published with notice, the artist cannot sue for 
copyright infringement if he has not registered the copyright.37 The re-
gistration can occur after the alleged infringement since the cause of ac-
tion is based on the underlying copyright which came into existence with 
the creation of the work.38 Nevertheless, if the artist has allowed the 
work to enter the public domain by publication without copyright notice, 
the copyright will be invalidated unless a reasonable effort is made to add 
notice to all copies subsequently distributed and unless, within five years 
after such publication without notice, registration for the work has been 
made.39 
Copyrights created after January 1, 1978 are protected from the mo-
ment they are fixed in tangible form until fifty years after the author's 
death.40 If the copyright holder is a corporate entity or other non-indi-
vidual, the protection is for one hundred years from the creation of the 
work or seventy-five years from its first publication, whichever expires 
first.41 A corporation usually obtains a copyright under the "work for 
hire" doctrine whereby an employer acquires ownership of the copyright 
of a work produced by an employee within the scope of his 
34. Sheehan, Why Don't Fine Artists Use Statutory Copyright? - An Empirical and 
Legal Survey, 24 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 157, 174-188 (1980). 
35. Id. at 193. 
36. 17 U.S.C. § 405 (1982). 
37. 17 U.S.c. § 411(a) (1982). 
38. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 7. 16[B). 
39. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2) (1982). 
40. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982). 
41. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1982). 
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employment.42 
Any work that was published without copyright notice prior to Jan-
uary 1, 1978 is in the public domain and receives no protection under 
1976 Copyright Act.43 Ifa work was published with proper notice before 
January 1, 1978, it is protected for an initial term of twenty-eight years 
beginning on the date when a copyright was first secured and may be 
extended for an additional forty-seven years.44 The total protection for 
pre-I978 works should not exceed seventy-five years.45 
As the prec«ding discussion makes clear, the act of publication has 
important consequences to an artist's rights under copyright law. The 
1976 Copyright Act defines publication as: 
the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the pub-
lic by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or 
lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a 
group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public 
performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A pub-
lic perfonnance or display of a work does not of itself constitute 
publication.46 
Under the definition of "publication" set forth in the 1976 Copy-
right Act, a publication does not occur when the public merely obtains a 
right to ~iew a work without obtaining possession of tangible copies of 
the work.47 If the circulation is expressly limited as to persons and pur-
pose, it will not be considered a distribution "to the public" and thus not 
a "publication" under the 1976 Copyright Act.48 "Limited publication" 
has been defined as an act which "communicates the contents of a manu-
script to a definitely selected group and for a limited purpose, and with-
out a right of diffusion, reproduction, distribution or sale."49 
The owner of the copyright has the following exclusive rights: 
(1) To reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work 
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending; 
42. 17 U.S.c. § 201(b) (1982). 
43. See 17 U.S.c. § 303 (1982). 
44. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1982). 
45. 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1982); 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 9.01[C]. 
46. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Although the 1909 Copyright Act did not define publica-
e tion, the present statutory definition generally conforms to prior case law develop-
ment of the concept of "publication." 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 19, at § 4.04. 
47. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). 
48. White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1952) (evidence was sufficient to 
show publication was not limited, because there was no limitation "put on the 
number of copies she might tum out, and none on the persons to whom they would 
go"). 
49. [d. 
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(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audio-visual works, 
to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomime, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including 
the individual images of a motion picture or other audio-visual work, to 
display the copyrighted work pUblicly. 50 
An artist who creates a copyrighted work has rights in the work 
itself and in its copyright. The artist, therefore, can sell the work of art 
and retain the copyright, sell both, or even sell parts of the copyright. 
Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, when an artist unconditionally sold a 
work of art, the law presumed that the copyright went to the buyer.51 
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, the sale of the artwork does not automat-
ically transfer all copyrights to the buyer.52 The buyer does have the 
right to display the work, but unless the contract specifies otherwise, the 
artist retains the exclusive right to reproduce the work, distribute repro-
ductions, and control, to some extent, its display. 53 
In addition to the protection afforded artists by federal copyright 
law, courts in the United States have recognized continuing rights of art-
ists in their works by combining other legislation with state common law 
causes of action. Without the necessity of registration, some protection 
has been afforded to artists under section 43(a) of the Lanham Trade-
mark Act54 which, along with traditional concepts of misrepresenta-
tion,55 unfair competition,56 defamation,57 and libel,58 can protect an 
author from having his name attributed to something he did not do and 
50. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). 
51. Grandma Moses Properties, Inc. v. This Week Magazine, 117 F. Supp. 348 
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) (plaintiff was denied a preliminary injunction to restrain defendant 
from advertising and selling prints because plaintiff had made an unrestricted sale of 
a picture and thus lost the copyright); Pushman v. New York Graphic Society, Inc., 
287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249 (1942). 
52. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1982). 
53. Stroupp, A Practical Guide to the Protection of Artists Through Copyright, Trade 
Secret, Patent, and Trademark Law, 3 COMM/ENT L.J. 189,206 (1981) ("Barring a 
written agreement, ... the copyright owner continues to have [the right to] ... 
control the public display of additional material objects including the work. Unfor-
tunately the law does not give an artist automatic right of access to his or her work, 
and without access the artist cannot exercise the right of reproduction."). 
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976); see also Sokolow, A New Weapon for Artists' Rights: 
Section 439(a)[sic] of the Lanham Trademark Act, 5 ART & LAW 32 (1980). Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act "prohibits the use of a false designation of 
origin or any false description or representation in connection with any goods or 
services which are introduced in commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(A) (1976). 
55. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); Noone v. 
Banner Talent Assoc., 398 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (use of name "Herman's 
Hermits" by former members of the group was misleading in that it implied that 
plaintiff, known by the public as Herman, was part of the new group and thus vio-
lated Lanham Trademark Act); Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975) (a misleading use of plaintiff's photograph on record album violated Lanham 
Trademark Act); see also Allen, Copyrights Color Wrongs: Are Old Films Pro-
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from having his artwork used in a way that negatively reflects on his 
professional reputation. 59 
An artist's right to protect his work from alteration or mutilation 
has also been recognized to some extent under traditional theories, such 
as breach of implied contract. 60 Whether an artist will have a remedy 
under any traditional theory is quite uncertain. As one commentator has 
complained, "[t]he application of so many different doctrines to a subject 
matter which is intrinsically homogeneous produces confusion; choice of 
theory becomes dependent on a fortuitous combination of factors, rather 
than on the basic needs of the problem."61 Absent legislation, whether 
an artist has a right to protect his reputation or work depends upon 
either the strength of his bargaining position at the time of sale and his 
ability to get the proper language into the contract of sale, or his per-
formance of the steps necessary for copyright protection, or a judicial 
finding of the proper facts affording protection under a common law con-
cept. The attitude of most artists towards business and their usually 
weak bargaining positions reduce the likelihood that an artist will retain 
such rights.62 
III. ARTISTS' RIGHTS IN OTHER LEGAL SYSTEMS 
Recognizing that art deserves protection and that the artist is in the 
best position to understand when a work is in danger, numerous coun-
tries have become signatories63 to the Berne Convention.64 The multilat-
tected?, 7 CAL. LAW. 12 (1987) (regarding protection of film artists' moral rights 
against "colorization"). 
56. See Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265, 266 (D. Mass. 1939) 
(plaintiff entitled to recover damages for misappropriation of title of plaintiff's novel 
under "unfair competition" theory). 
57. The court in Gilliam, 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), held that presentation of a muti-
lated work, if accompanied by the author's name, violated section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act, because it "impaired the integrity of appellants' work and represented to 
the public as the product of the appellants what was actually a mere caricature of 
their talents." 538 F.2d at 25. Cf Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. General Signal 
Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984). 
58. Benson v. Paul Winley Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Clevenger v. 
Baker, Voorhis & Co., 8 N.Y.2d 187, 168 N.E.2d 643, 203 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1960). 
59. Clevenger v. Baker, Voorhi~ & Co., 8 N.Y.2d 187, 168 N.E.2d 643, 203 N.Y.S.2d 
812 (1960). 
60. See Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952) (a contractual obligation to use 
author's name implies a duty not to change the work). 
61. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists. Authors and 
Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 575 (1940). 
62. Sheehan, supra note 34, at 188-189. 
63. For a list of signatories see Flacks, Out of UNESCO and into Berne: Has the United 
States Participation in the Berne Convention for International Copyright Become Es-
sential?, 4 CARDOZO ART. & ENT. L.J. 203, 204 n.39 (1985). 
64. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literacy and Artistic Works, signed at 
Berne, Sept. 9,1886 reprinted in UNESCO & WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY ORGANIZATION, 3 COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, 
Multilateral Conventions, Berne Copyright Union, item A-I (1982); revised at 
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eral treaty sets forth minimum standards for the protection of literary 
and artistic works. Under the treaty, ratifying nations will extend to 
writers and artists of other signatory nations at least the minimum pro-
tection mandated by the Convention. Such minimum protection is pre-
scribed in Article 6bis of the Paris Revision of the Berne Convention, 
which provides: 
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and 
even after transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the 
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any dis-
tortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other deroga-
tory action in relation to, the said work, which would be 
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.65 
This is clearly a general articulation of "moral rights" and is intended to 
be additional to the rights obtained under copyright law.66 Because this 
recognition of moral rights is the bare minimum which signatories to the 
treaty must afford the artists of other signatory nations, the United States 
has not been able to participate in the Berne Convention and has been 
criticized for not doing SO.67 
The United States is unusual in not recognizing artists' continuing 
rights in their works. No less than 76 nations68 are signatories to the 
Berne Convention and recognize, in one form or another, artists' contin-
uing moral rights. Although the Berne Convention "is generally recog-
nized as the superior instrument in that its adherents agree to a higher 
standard of protection,"69 the United States has found that membership 
in other treaties, such as The Universal Copyright Convention,70 is more 
Paris, July 24, 1971 (effective July 10, 1974) reprinted in 4 M. NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT app. 27 (1987) [hereinafter "Paris Revision"]. 
65. Paris Revision, art. 6bis (1) reprinted in 4 M. NIMMER, supra note 64, at app. 27, 27-
5 to 6 (1987). 
66. Flacks, supra note 63, at 222 ("there is a clear statement of obligation to protect the 
. author's moral rights in addition to well established economic rights. This derives 
from the French and German ... moral rights."). 
67. Id. at 208 n.39. United States copyright holders commonly secure Convention ben-
efits by "simultaneously" (within 30 days) publishing works in a Convention coun-
try, such as Canada. Folsom, Gordon, Spangola, Jr., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS 663 (1986). 
68. Flacks, supra note 63, at 204. 
69. Senate Subcommittee Hears Views on Berne Adherence Legislation, 35 Pat. Trade-
mark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 871, 372 (Mar. 10, 1988) [hereinafter "Berne Ad-
herence Legislation"]' 
70. Sept. 6, 1952,6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324, amended July 24, 1971,25 U.S.T. 
1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868. Other treaties on copyright to which the United States is a 
signatory include the Pan American Copyright Convention (Buenos Aires), Aug. 
11, 1910, 38 Stat. 1785, T.I.A.S. No. 593, 155 U.N.T.S. 179; Convention for the 
Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their 
Phonograms, opened for signature Oct. 29, 1971,25 U.S.T. 309, T.I.A.S. No. 7808, 
866 U.N.T.S. 67; Amity and Economic Relations, May 29, 1966, United States-
Thailand, 19 U.S.T. 5843, T.I.A.S. No. 6540; Industrial Property in Korea, May 19, 
1908, United States-Japan, 35 Stat. 2041 (abrogated April 22, 1953). 
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compatible with its present law. These conventions afford a copyright 
holder the protection of the country in which the copyright was formally 
obtained,71 but do not define that protection and thus avoid the moral 
rights issue.72 
Legislation is presently being considered in both houses of Congress 
which would affect the United States' ability to adhere to the Berne Con-
vention.73 In the debate that has raged around the proposed legislation, 
magazine publishers have argued against an explicit statutory provision 
for moral rights on the ground that it would "drastically limit the edi-
tor's freedom of judgment."74 In favor of moral rights, filmmaker 
George Lucas testified before a Senate Subcommittee that engineers, with 
the permission of copyright owners but without conSUlting the artists 
who produce films, currently can add color to black-and-white movies, 
change the soundtrack, speed up the pace, and add or delete material. 75 
The apparent consensus emerging from the debate is that the United 
States could adhere to the Convention without amendment of the 1976 
Copyright Act to include moral rights provisions, since adequate protec-
tion is already afforded under common law and other federal statutes. 76 
Recently, Representative Robert Kastenmeier seems to have accepted 
this minimalist view and dropped moral rights from his proposed legisla-
tion, the "Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988."77 Most dan-
gerous to the future of moral rights is legislation proposed by Sentor 
Orrin Hatch. Under his proposed legislation, section 306(b) of the 1976 
Copyright Act would provide, "No Author ... shall be entitled ... to 
any moral rights under Federal or State statutes or the common law."78 
Each nation that recognizes moral rights allows a different duration 
of protection depending upon such nation's concept of the nature of the 
right being protected. Most nations, following the lead of France, view 
moral rights as distinct from copyrights in that moral rights protect not 
only an artist's rights in his work but the work itself. These nations, 
taking a "dualist" approach, tend to allow the perpetual protection of 
71. See sources cited supra note 70. 
72. Flacks, supra note 63, at 206. 
73. H.R. 1623, H.R. 2962, S. 1301, S. 1971, l00th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); see Berne 
Adherence Legis/ation, supra note 69, at 372. Note that H.R. 4262, looth Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1988) was sent to the House Committee on Judiciary in lieu of H.R. 1623 on 
March 28, 1988, was approved by the full committee on April 28, 1988, and was 
passed by unanimous vote of the House of Representatives on May 10, 1988. The 
Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks incorporated provi-
sions of S. 1971 into S. BOlon April 13, 1988. 
74. Berne Adherence Legis/ation, supra note 69, at 373 (citing John Mack Carter of the 
American Society of Magazine Editors). 
75. [d. at 373-74. 
76. [d. at 373. 
77. H.R. 1623, looth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); see 35 Pat. Trademark & Copyright L.J. 
(BNA) No. 872,414-417 (Mar. 17, 1988) (reprinting text of H.R. 1623). 
78. Berne Adherence Legis/ation, supra note 69, at 373 (quoting S. 1971, looth Cong., 
1st Sess. (1987». 
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moral rights by an artist or the artist's representatives. 79 
It is remarkable that the concept of moral rights was developed judi-
cially in France, a civil law country where "one of the most treasured 
tenets of the conventional wisdom ... is that law is made by legislators 
and executives, not by judges. "80 Although originally developed by case 
law,8' moral rights in France were finally codified. 82 Under the French 
Code, an artist's moral rights are not dependent on contract and in fact 
cannot be relinquished by contract.83 The concept of the inalienability of 
an artist's moral rights is so deeply ingrained in France that courts will 
not grant specific performance against an artist who has contracted to do 
a work of art. 84 
Although French courts have protected an artist's right to prevent 
the alteration or mutilation of his work, the judges were initially uncer-
tain whether, under their Code, an artist could prevent the total destruc-
tion of a work of art. Some judges reasoned that if the work no longer 
existed, it could not injure the artist's reputation in the same way that a 
public display of a distorted version would. 85 Although this reasoning 
79. Lubic, New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act Incorporates European Moral Rights 
Doctrine, 8 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 362, 371 (1985). French law contains a dual doc-
trine of droit d' auteur, which is essentially the French version of copyright protec-
tion, and the droit moral, which has been characterized as "the negative right to 
prevent violations of the literary personality of the author." Id. at 465 (quoting 
Pierre Masse). 
80. Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HAST. L.J. 1023, 1026 (1976). 
81. Roeder, supra note 61, at 556 (citing Fortin v. Prevost-B1ondel, Cour de Paris, Jan. 
25, 1889, D.P. 1890.2.243 (paternity right); Agnes dit Sorel v. Fayard Freres, Trib. 
Seine, Dec. 16, 1899, D.P. 1900.2.152 (integrity right); Cinquin v. Lecocq, Civ., 
June 25, 1902, D.P. 1903.1.5 (official recognition of the doctrine by the Cour de 
Cassation, the highest civil court in France». 
82. Law No. 57-296 art. 6 ("Journal Official" March 14, 1957, p.2723; April 19, 1957, 
p.4143 (effective March II, 1958). See generally Strauss, The Moral Right of the 
Author, 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 965, 966-67 (A. Fisher ed. 1963). Article 6 
provides: 
The author shall enjoy the right to respect for his name, his author-
ship, and his work. This right shall be attached to his person. It shall be 
perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible. It may be transmitted mortis 
causa to the heirs of the author. The exercise of this right may be con-
ferred on a third person by testamentary provisions. . 
/d. at 967. 
83. See Sarraute, Current Theory of Moral Rights of Authors and Artists Under French 
Law, 16 AM. J. COMPo L. 465, 478 (1968) reprinted in FELDMAN AND WElL, ART 
WORKS: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE 29-51, at 41 (1974) (C. Civ. art. 543(6) "the 
author enjoys the right to have his name, his authorship, and the integrity of his 
work respected. This right is appurtenant to the individual artist. It is perpetual, 
unassignable, and cannot be barred by limitations of time. "). 
84. See Merryman, supra note 80, at 1024 (citing Guille v. Colmant, [1967] Recueil 
Dalloz-Sirey [D.S. Jur.] 284 [1967] Gazette du Palais [Gaz. PaL] I. 17 (Cour d' 
appel, Paris». This is so even though the normal remedy for breach of contract in 
France is specific performance rather than money damages. R. SCHLESINGER, COM-
PARATIVE LAW 665 (5th ed. 1988). 
85. See Merryman, supra note 80, at 1034-35 (citing Sudre v. Commune de Baixas, 
[1936] D.P. III 57 (Conseil d' Etat) (when City Council removed a poorly main-
1987] Artists' Rights 75 
might preclude a cause of action in a nation taking a more objective view 
of moral rights, the French courts have held that moral rights protection 
does extend to an artist's protection of his work from total destruction. 86 
Indeed, French courts have even extended this continuing right to work 
that the artist himself discarded and nearly destroyed.87 An artist has 
the right to prevent the public from seeing his work, and if he has at-
tempted to destroy it and the remains are found by another person, that 
person may not, against the artist's wishes, restore and display the 
work.88 The French Code provides not only that moral rights are "unas-
signable" or inalienable, but also that they are perpetual and cannot be 
barred by time limitations.89 Under French law, the artist's heirs, as well 
as art associations, may exercise in perpetuity the rights of a deceased 
artist. 90 
Other nations, such as Germany, have a "monist" approach and 
conceive of an artist's moral rights and copyrights as a unified whole, 
even though they are viewed as encompassing rights of different quali-
ties.91 Copyrights in Germany are considered patrimonial or property 
rights, which protect the artist's pecuniary interest in the artwork. 
Moral rights are classified as "personality" rights which are constitution-
ally protected and surpass copyrights to include rights of reputation, oc-
cupation, profession, integrity of one's person, name and privacy.92 
Because moral rights in Germany are viewed as protecting the artist 
rather than the work itself, they are not perpetual but are allowed the 
same duration as copyrights,93 and all of the artist's rights pass only to 
his heirs.94 One civil law scholar asserts that this limited duration of 
moral rights is one of the substantive distinctions constituting what at 
first blush appears to be a purely academic divergence between French 
and German views of moral rights.95 
European concepts of moral rights have been particularly trouble-
some to courts in the United States, because such concepts conflict with 
traditional United States notions of freedom of contract and the right of 
tained sculpture from a city fountain, destroyed it, and used the pieces to fill holes in 
the road, artist was awarded substantial damages». 
86. Merryman, supra note 80, at 1034. 
87. Sarraute, supra note 83, at 468-69 (citing Camoin v. Carco, Judgment of Mr. G, 
1931 (Cour d' Appel, Paris 1931». 
88. Sarraute, supra note 83, at 468-69. 
89. Id. at 478. 
90. Id. at 483-84. Art associations may only exercise the artist's moral rights if the 
artist has no heirs. Id. at 484. 
91. Lubic, supra note 79, at 371. 
92. Merryman, supra note 80, at 1025. 
93. Marcus, The Morql Right of the Artist in Germany, 25 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (AS-
CAP) 93, 115 (1975) (right lasts for life of the artist plus seventy years). 
94. Michaelides-Nouaros, Protection of the Author's Moral Interests After His Death as a 
Cultural Postulate, 15 COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF U.S.A. BULLETIN 35, 38 (1979). 
95. Marcus, supra note 93, at 95. 
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free and unencumbered transfer of property.96 Nevertheless, four states 
have passed moral rights legislation,97 and federal legislation has been 
proposed to give artists' continuing rights in their work.98 
IV. MORAL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
Attempts to incorporate moral rights by name in federal copyright 
legislation have been unsuccessfu1.99 Senator Edward Kennedy recently 
introduced moral rights legislation before Congress. lOO Oregon,101 Mas-
sachusetts,102 New York,103 and Californial04 have passed legislation 
granting artists continuing rights in their works. State legislation in this 
area is subject to challenge on the ground that state statutes violate the 
Supremacy Clause 105 or the derivative challenge106 that this area is pre-
empted by the 1976 Copyright Act.107 
A. The Proposed Maryland Art Preservation Act 
The Maryland Art Preservation Act ("MAP A"), 108 as proposed, 
would give an artist continuing rights of integrity and paternity in his 
work even if such rights are not reserved in a contract of sale. The sub-
ject matter of the proposed legislation is limited to only original art of 
"recognized quality."109 In determining whether a work of fine art is of 
recognized quality, the trier of fact is directed to rely on the opinions of 
artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of art museums and 
other persons involved with the creation or marketing of fine art. 110 
The proposed legislation protects the following types of art: (1) vis-
ual renditions including paintings, drawings, sculptures, mosaics or pho-
tographs; (2) works of calligraphy; (3) works of graphic art, including 
96. See Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987) (court strongly 
criticized moral rights); Monta, The Concept of 'Copyright' versus the 'Droit d' Au-
teur', 32 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 185 (1959). 
97. See infra notes 101-104. 
98. Kaufman, It's Time to Grant Rights to Artists: Kennedy Bill Would Help, 9 LEGAL 
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1986 at 15, col. 1. 
99. See Strauss, supra note 82, at 978. 
100. See Kaufman, supra note 98, at 15, col. 1; Chapin & Arthurs, A Bill of Rights For 
Arts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1987, at A31, col. 1. 
101. OR. REV. STAT. § 359.350-.365 (1981) (Art Work Reproduction Rights). 
102. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West 1987). See V. Koven, Observations 
on the Massachusetts Art Preservation Act, 71 MASS. L. REV. 101 (1986). 
103. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW, §§ 11.01, 14.03 (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
104. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 987-997 (West Supp. 1984). 
105. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
106. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-23, at 376-377 (1978); Gantz, 
Protecting Artists' Moral Rights: A Critique of the California Art Preservation Act as 
a Model for Statutory Reform, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 873, 893-895 (1981). 
107. 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-810 (1977 & Supp. 1981). 
108. Maryland Art Preservation Act, S. 458 (1986) (see Appendix I). 
109. Id. § 404A(C). 
110. Id. 
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etchings, lithographs, offset prints or silk screens; (4) craft works in 
materials including clay, textile, fiber, wood, metal, plastic, or glass; and 
(5) works in mixed media including collages or works consisting of any 
combination of works included in the above list. III The proposed legisla-
tion expressly does not protect work prepared by an artist under contract 
to be used for commercial purposes by its purchaser. 112 
The rights given under the proposed legislation can be waived con-
tractually by the artist. 113 Further waiver can occur with respect to a 
work of art that has become part of a building. MAP A provides that 
unless an instrument expressly reserving the artist's rights and signed by 
the building owner is recorded among the land records of the county 
where the building is located, the artist's rights in his artwork "shall be 
waived." 114 If the artwork which is part of the building can be removed· 
without unreasonable expense or substantial harm to the work, the 
owner of the building may not remove it without the artist's consent, 
unless the owner shows diligence without success in trying to notify the 
artist in writing of his intended action affecting the artwork or shows the 
artist's failure within ninety days after notification either to remove the 
artwork himself or to pay for its remova1. 115 
An artist's "rights of paternity" are protected by section 404C, 
which provides, "The artist shall retain at all times the right to claim 
authorship, and to receive proper credit, or for just and valid reason, to 
disclaim authorship of the artist's work of fine art."1\6 This section is 
intended to give the author of a work the right to be acknowledged as its 
creator, a right to which he is not clearly entitled under common law 
unless he is well known to the public. 117 State courts generally do recog-
nize a cause of action in favor of a person who has acquired a reputation. 
Such right of action is labeled the "right of publicity," generally consid-
ered a property right and, as such, is both alienable and inheritable. 118 In 
California this common law right has been likened to copyright and has 
been held to have a duration for the well-known artist's life plus fifty 
111. Id. § 404A(C)(I)(I-V). 
112. Id. § 404A(C)(2). 
113. Id. § 404F(3). 
114. Id. § 404G(A). This section is unclear in many respects and should be redrafted. 
For example, the section does not indicate whether artwork affixed to the land on 
which the building is located is considered "part of the building." Also, the section 
does not provide the time when an instrument reserving the artist's rights must be 
recorded. Conceivably, waiver may be precluded by recordation of such an instru-
ment some time after the artwork is installed. Finally, the section begins to address 
circumstances in which removal of the artwork will cause significant damage to the 
same, but is an incomplete sentence. 
115. Id. § 404G(B). 
116. Id. § 404C. 
117. See supra notes 7-11. 
118. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 908 (1979). Cf Lugosi V. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 823-24, 160 
Cal. Rptr. 323, 329, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (1979) (an artist's pUblicity or "exploitation" 
right deemed personal in nature and as such assignable but not inheritable). 
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years.119 The artist who has little or no reputation has uncertain or no 
protection without the proposed legislation. 120 MAP A would make clear 
that both well-known and unknown artists have an assignable and inher-
itable paternity right. 121 
Of course, even with the proposed legislation, an artist, whether 
well-known or unknown, must be careful not to contract away his pater-
nity right. In this regard the proposed legislation is consistent with prior 
case law under which the right of paternity, even when attached to a 
right of publicity, is assignable by contract and limited to a duration of 
fifty years after the author's death. 122 
There may be situations in which an artist, because of modifications 
or alterations to his work, will want to be disassociated from that work. 
Under MAPA, the artist would have the right to disclaim authorship for 
"just and valid reason."123 There are no examples in the proposed legis-
lation of a just and valid reason. Unless these are added or this language 
is clarified, courts construing MAPA may limit this right to situations 
when defacement, mutilation, or alteration of the work has occurred. 
Most artists naturally are more concerned that they be able to pre-
vent unwanted changes to their work. This "right of integrity" is pro-
tected under the proposed legislation by section 404B(A), which 
provides, "Except an artist who owns and possesses a work of fine art 
which the artist has created, a person may not intentionally commit, or 
authorize the intentional commission of, any physical defacement, muti-
lation, alteration, or destruction of a work of fine art."124 
Absent such legislation, the artist has no right of integrity unless he 
is careful to reserve such right in the contract of sale. 125 Under MAPA, 
the artist will not be deemed to have waived the right of integrity in the 
contract of sale unless such waiver is express, in writing, and signed by 
the artist. 126 MAPA provides an exception, however, for artwork that 
119. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d at 847, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45, 603 P.2d 
at 446-47. 
120. See Note, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent of the Right of Publicity, 29 HAST. 
L.l. 751, 752-59 (1978). Commentators have debated whether an unknown person 
has a cause of action based on a right of privacy, whether the plaintiff's status as a 
celebrity should determine the possession of a right of pUblicity and whether the 
right is a personal right or a property right in terms of inheritability and 
assignability. 
121. Maryland Art Preservation Act § 404F (providing with respect to "any" artist that 
the rights under MAPA are inheritable for a period of fifty years after the artist's 
death by the artist's heir, legatee or personal representative). 
122. [d.; see Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323,603 P.2d 
425 (1979); see also Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. 
denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948) (court refused to recognize moral rights in contraven-
tion of express contractual assignment of use of well-known artist's name in connec-
tion with artwork to be provided under same contract). 
123. Maryland Art Preservation Act § 404C. 
124. [d. § 404B(A). 
-125. Roeder, supra note 61, at 570; see supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
126. Maryland Art Preservation Act § 404F(3). 
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has become part of a building. '27 
Under common law, even if a right of integrity is recognized, an 
adequate remedy may not be available. 128 Relief may be limited to mon-
etary damages based on injury to the artist's reputation, rather than an 
injunction to prevent continued injury to the work itself.129 The pro-
posed Maryland legislation is clearly intended to protect the work of art 
itself as well as the reputation of the artist. MAPA sets forth the follow-
ing remedies for violation of its provisions: (1) injunctive relief; (2) ac-
tual damages; (3) punitive damages; (4) reasonable attorney and expert 
witness fees; or (5) any other relief which the court deems proper. I3O 
Another aspect of the remedies afforded by the proposed legislation 
which would not be available at common law is the continuing enforce-
ability of rights after the artist's death. The rights created by this legisla-
tion are available for the duration of the artist's life plus fifty years. 13I 
Moral rights would have the same duration as copyrights. '32 After the 
artist's death, his heirs or personal representative can assert these 
rights. 133 MAPA does, however, contain a statute of limitations which 
provides that a cause of action must be brought within three years after 
the act constituting a violation of MAP A or within one year after the 
discovery of such act, whichever period is longer. 134 
In summary, the Maryland Art Preservation Act would give an art-
127. Id. § 404G(A) (discussed supra note 114 and accompanying text). 
128. See, e.g., Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 579, 89 N.Y.S.2d 
813, 819 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (court rejected moral rights argument advanced by artist in 
support of claim against church to restore frescoes painted by artist, brought after 
church had painted over frescoes pursuant to artist's transfer of copyright to 
church). But see Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 
1976) (discussed supra notes 6, 14). 
129. E.g., Meliodon v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 457, 195 A. 905 (1938). 
130. Maryland Art. Preservation Act § 404D(A). This section should be redrafted, be-
cause in its present form it suggests that the enumerated remedies are mutually 
exclusive. Punitive damages will be sought under moral rights legislation. See Pel-
letier v. Eisenberg, 177 Cal. App. 3d 558, 223 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1986). The punitive 
damages provision under the proposed legislation has been criticized, however, be-
cause the court may award such damages to an organization engaged in charitable 
or educational activities involving the fine arts rather than to the artist himself. 
Artists' lawyers argue that a plaintiff will seek punitive damages more aggressively if 
he has a better chance of receiving such damages, and it is the likelihood of having 
to pay such damages that will most heavily impress upon purchasers of fine art the 
seriousness of the rights afforded by MAPA. 
131. Maryland Art Preservation Act § 404F(I). 
132. As in Germany, the moral rights granted under MAPA would not be of an indefi-
nite duration but would last only as long as copyrights. This is so even though the 
general introductory language of MAP A sounds like the modified dualist approach 
found in France, under which moral rights are also seen as protecting the work of 
art itself. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text. The indicated purpose of 
MAPA is to provide "against the enumerated acts being committed against a work 
of fine art," thereby encompassing both economic and artistic concerns. Marcus, 
supra note 93, at 95. 
133. Maryland Art Preservation Act § 404F(1). 
134. Id. § 404H. 
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ist a bundle of rights consisting of the right to claim authorship and to 
prevent others from claiming authorship as well as the right to disavow a 
work of art. Along with paternity rights, MAP A would grant an artist 
the right to prevent others from intentionally altering, destroying or mu-
tilating a work of art. In addition to these traditional moral rights, the 
artist can also prevent the negligent commission of such acts by a framer, 
conservator, restorer or dealer. 135 
B. Constitutional Vulnerability of MAPA 
1. Preemption 
The Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California 136 ruled that the 
Copyright Clause of the Constitution i37 does not prohibit states from ex-
ercising control over copyrights and stated that "[a]lthough the Copy-
right Clause . . . recognizes the potential benefits of a national system, it 
does not indicate that all writings are of national interest or that state 
legislation is, in all cases, unnecessary or precluded."138 Although Gold-
stein dealt with the Copyright Act of 1909, there is no reason to believe 
that the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act makes state copyright 
laws constitutionally invalid. The 1976 Copyright Act does, however, set 
forth its own preemption test,139 under which a state law is preempted if 
it protects "legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights within the general scope of [federal] copyright [law] ... 
[for] works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion and come within the subject matter of copyright .... "140 
The 1976 Copyright Act grants to an artist exclusive rights to 
reproduce, to prepare derivative works, and to perform, distribute copies 
of, and display, the work. 141 Whether these rights are equivalent to the 
rights of paternity and integrity granted under MAP A will determine 
MAPA's constitutionality. Unfortunately, in spite of Congress's stated 
purpose of the 1976 Copyright Act to create a clear test for preemp-
tion,142 the concept of "equivalency" lacks clear definition, in part be-
cause of the confusing legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act. 143 
Initially, the House Report for the 1976 Copyright Act stated that 
the equivalency test provided that a state cause of action was not pre-
empted if it contained elements that were "different in nature" from 
135. [d. § 404B(B). 
136. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
138. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 556-57 (1973). 
139. 17 U.S.c. § 301 (1976). 
140. 17 U.S.c. § 301(a) (Supp. III 1979); § 30l(b)(I)-(3) (1976). 
141. 17 U.S.c. § 106 (1976). 
142. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 (1976). 
143. For a detailed account see G. Francione, "California Art Preservation Act and Fed-
eral Pre-emption by the 1976 Copyright Act-Equivalence and Actual Conflict," 31 
Copyright L. Symp. 105, 122-125 (1984) [hereinafter "Francione")' 
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copyright infringement. l44 Examples of such state causes of action were 
listed as follows: breach of contract, breach of trust, invasion of privacy, 
defamation, and deceptive trade practices. 145 Because these state causes 
of action require the proof of elements beyond what is needed to show 
infringement of copyright, their inclusion as examples would have indi-
cated that Congress did not intend to preempt them by passing the 1976 
Copyright Act. 
The version of the bill actually voted upon by the House of Repre-
sentatives contained an additional type of state cause of action, "misap-
propriation," intended not to be preempted, exemplified by International 
News Service v. Associated Press (the "INS" case).146 In INS, the state 
cause of action for misappropriation was founded on the defendant's 
"copying news from bulletin boards and from early editions of complain-
ant's newspapers and selling this, either bodily or after rewriting it, to 
defendant's customers."147 Prior to the debate on the bill, the Justice 
Department pointed out that INS had been overturned in the wake of 
Erie v. Tompkins. 148 This disclosure prompted the House judiciary 
Committee to delete all examples of state causes of action not preempted 
by the 1976 Copyright Act. The subsequent debate nevertheless indi-
cates that the state causes of action listed were not intended to be pre-
empted,149 even though the elements of misappropriation were not 
different in kind from the elements of copyright infringement. . 
Recently, however, courts have held that INS-type state causes of 
action are preempted under the 1976 Copyright Act,150 because a "state 
statute creating rights which could be violated by the mere act of repro-
duction, performance, distribution or display is preempted by the stat-
ute."151 Under these holdings, if the artist, in order to maintain a cause 
144. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1976). 
145. Id. 
146. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132, 133 (1976). 
147. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 231 (1918). 
148. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The International News Service case was considered "no longer 
authoriative" in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. De Costa, 377 F.2d 315 (1st 
Cir.), cerro denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967). 
149. Part of this debate is reproduced in 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 19, § 1.01 [B][I], at 1-
14.5 to 1-16 (1987). 
150. Professor Nimmer believes that the state cause of action articulated in International 
News Service would not be preempted under the 1976 Copyright Act because the 
subject matter (news) is not protected under the Act. Id. § 1.01[B][I] at 1-17; see 
Francione, supra note 143, at 126 (citing recent district court decisions which hold 
that state causes of action for misappropriation based on similar elements are pre-
empted); see also Suid V. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980); 
Mitchell V. Penton/Industrial Publishing Co., 486 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ohio 1979); 
Orth-O-Vision V. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
151. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. V. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 443 (S.D. Ohio 1980), 
aff'd, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982) (court found that an Ohio statute prohibiting 
licensing of a motion picture to a theater owner without the theater owner first 
viewing it was not preempted by 1976 Copyright Act); see also Factors Etc., Inc. V. 
Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 
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of action for violation of his integrity or paternity rights under MAP A, 
must allege only those facts sufficient to maintain a cause of action under 
federal copyright law, the state cause of action is preempted. 152 
The Supreme Court has not yet defined the equivalency test, and the 
opinions of those who have written on the subject are divided. Professor 
Nimmer's position,153 which is based on current lower court decisions, 
stresses a qualitative difference test. 154 He argues that the confusing leg-
islative history of the 1976 Copyright Act should be ignored and that the 
preemption section should be applied according to its terms in two steps. 
First, a court should ask whether the state right or law by its terms 
or as applied involves copyrightable work. 155 State moral rights legisla-
tion generally and MAP A in particular do cover the same subject matter 
as the 1976 Copyright Act, namely visual renditions and graphic, sculp-
tural, or mixed media works.156 If the type of property concerned is the 
same as that mentioned in the 1976 Copyright Act, it meets the first step 
of the test for preemption, even if for some other reason it does not qual-
ify for copyright protection. 157 
Second, if the work does meet the first step, the court should ask 
whether the conduct which constitutes the state cause of action requires 
proof of an element other than the mere act of reproduction, distribution, 
performance or display. Professor Nimmer suggests that in applying this 
step of the test, a state right, in order to be preempted, need merely be 
"within the general scope of copyright ... even if the precise contours of 
the right differ from those contained in [the 1976 Copyright Act]. ... 
The fact that the state created right is either broader or narrower ... will 
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982) (allowing a state cause of action for invasion 
of privacy because it required the additional proof of celebrity). 
152. "If under state law the act of reproduction, performance, distribution or display, no 
matter whether the law includes all such acts or only some, will in itself infringe the 
state created right, then such right is pre-empted." 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 19, 
§ 1.01[B][I] at 1-12. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 501 F. 
Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (court denied plaintiff's state causes of action for con-
version and tortious interference with contract, because they were based on 
equivalent copyright protection of exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution 
of copyrightable work, despite fact that state causes of action needed proof of addi-
tional elements of intent), aff'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 
471 U.S. 539 (1985) (the appeal to Supreme Court predicated on the defense of "fair 
use"). 
153. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 19, § 1.01[B][I] at 1-9. 
154. See Harper & Row. Publishers. Inc., 501 F. Supp. at 852-53 (court looked to "the 
essence of the plaintiff's ... claim" to see if "rights under the facts of a particular 
case [are] ... qualitatively different from [copyright protection)." Id.). 
155. "If a work by reason of its content falls within the subject matter of copyright as 
specified by sections 102 and 103 [of the 1976 Copyright Act] it is not excluded 
from ... pre-emption simply because it is ineligible for federal protection by reason 
of its failure to meet the prescribed federal standards," such as lack of originality or 
lack of notice. I M. NIMMER, supra note 19, § 1.01 [B][2], at 1-22.2. 
156. 17 U.S.c. § 301 (1977); Maryland Art Preservation Act § 404A(C)(l). 
157. I M. NIMMER, supra note 19, § 1.01 [B][2], at 1-22.1. 
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not save it from preemption."158 
The application of this two-step test might mean that even if the 
1976 Copyright Act will not give protection (perhaps because the subject 
matter lacks some federal formality),159 the state cause of action will be 
preempted simply because the act of reproduction, performance, distri-
bution or display alone will give rise to that state cause of action. 
Professors Hoffman l60 and Katz161 and Ms. Gantz162 argue that 
moral rights are qualitatively different from copyright protection, which 
protects only economic interests. This argument apparently proceeds 
from the premise that a state right of action is preempted only when its 
sole object is to protect an author's or artist's economic interest in his or 
her work. Professor Francione asserts that this argument confuses the 
origins of moral rights protection with the elements which must be 
shown to acquire such protection in a cause of action. 163 
Assuming that courts will use, as they have in the recent past, Pro-
fessor Nimmer's approach to the equivalency test, the issue becomes 
whether the state rights provided by MAPA will require more or differ-
ent proof for their vindication than mere proof of reproduction, distribu-
tion, performance or display. MAPA requires that the plaintiff prove 
that the acts done by the defendant were done either intentionally or in 
the case of framers, conservators or dealers, negligently. Cases indicate 
that this is not a qualitative difference such as to avoid preemption. l64 
The assertion of the right of paternity under MAP A will require the 
plaintiff to prove in some cases not only acts of reproduction, distribu-
tion, performance or display, but also the act of attribution or misattribu-
tion by the defendant. 165 This would be an additional element l66 to those 
158. [d. § 1.01[B][l), at 1-10 to 1-12; see Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 
430 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (plaintiff could not maintain a state cause of action for unfair 
competition based on misappropriation of his book's contents, ideas and concepts 
since such claim is based on rights within the scope of 1976 Copyright Act). 
159. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 19, § 1.01[B][2], at 1-22.1. 
160. Hoffman, The California Art Preservation Act, 5 ART & L. 53, 56 (1980). 
161. Katz, Copyright Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976: the Case of Droit de 
Suite, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 200, 217 (1978). 
162. Gantz, supra note 5, at 877-78. 
163. Francione, supra note 143, at 129-30. 
164. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 501 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980), aff'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 
(l985); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Sys., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 726, 739 
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (state cause of action for misappropriation does not avoid preemp-
tion to protect reproduction rights even though it requires additional element of 
commercial immorality); see also Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224, 1226 (lith 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984) (defendant's conviction under state law 
of dealing in stolen property (bootleg recording tapes) reversed because 1976 Copy-
right Act preempted state law even though state law required prosecutor to establish 
scienter). 
165. Maryland Art Preservation Act § 404C. 
166. Editorial Photocolor Archives, Inc. v. Granger Collection, 1983 Copyright L. Dec. 
(CCH) 11 25,547 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (state cause of action for unfair competition 
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listed in the 1976 Copyright Act. In those cases where the artist is com-
plaining that the work of art is being displayed without any attribution, 
there may be a greater problem with preemption, in that mere display 
may violate MAPA. 167 Furthermore, since failure to attribute paternity 
to an artist or an author may not be actionable infringement of the 1976 
Copyright Act an artist might be left without a remedy.168 
For an artist to maintain a cause of action for a violation of his right 
of integrity under MAP A, the artist must prove, in addition to the acts 
mentioned by the 1976 Copyright Act, that the defendant defaced, muti-
lated, altered or destroyed the work. 169 This does not mean that there 
will never be a problem of preemption in the assertion of integrity rights 
under MAPA. For instance, the mere hanging of a painting upside 
down arguably would be enough for a violation of MAP A, and this 
would require proof of no element other than display.17° The artist in 
this situation would have to prove some act of alteration in addition to, 
or instead of, mere display in order to avoid preemption. 
Professors Nimmer and Francione disagree about whether rights 
granted artists by other state legislation are preempted when they apply 
to reproduction or derivative works. An argument exists that protection 
against alteration iri MAP A includes protection against unauthorized re-
production or the use of one's work in a derivative work. 17l If so, then 
the right to prevent alteration under MAP A would be equivalent to the 
right under the 1976 Copyright Act to prevent derivative works based 
upon a copyrighted work. This would be true unless the "alteration" is 
also a "defacement" or "mutilation," thus adding an element to the art-
ist's cause of action under MAP A. Professor Nimmer argues that if the 
defacement or mutilation claim is merely SUbjective, it is not truly an 
additional element and thus does not avoid preemption.172 The protec-
tion of MAPA would apply specifically to "original art work"173 and if 
so limited will not be subject to preemption with regard to the reproduc-
tion right of the 1976 Copyright Act. 
Professor Francione has raised yet another potential problem with 
and misappropriation exists when defendant wrongfully held out to public that de-
fendant had reproduction rights). 
167. The language in Maryland Art Preservation Act § 404C, "[t]he artist shall retain at 
all times the right to ... receive proper credit," is broad enough to encompass mere 
unauthorized display within those acts intended to be prohibited. 
168. Professor Francione argues to the contrary that there is a qualitatively different 
right under state and federal law. His argument does, however, seem to be based on 
the same premise which he criticizes in other commentators: that the origin of the 
right makes it qualitatively different. See Francione, supra note 143, at 133-34. 
169. Maryland Art Preservation Act § 404B. 
170. Francione, supra note 143, at 134. 
171. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 8.21[C]][I], at 8-250 to -252. Cf Francione, supra 
note 143, at 137. 
172. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 8.21[C][2] at 8-261. Contra Francione, supra note 143, at 
137-38. 
173. Maryland Art Preservation Act § 404A(C). 
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state moral rights legislation which might affect MAPA. He points out 
that when applying the equivalency test, commentators have assumed 
that the artist and the copyright-holder are the same person. 174 Preemp-
tion might occur, however, not only because a state right is equivalent to 
a federal right, but also when a state right conflicts with a federally con-
ferred right. 175 For example, an artist might sell a modem painting to-
gether with the copyright to X, and X might later display the painting 
publicly in a 17th century gold frame. X has the exclusive federal copy-
right to display publicly and the artist has the state granted moral right 
to prevent alteration. The 1976 Copyright Act does not state that a 
copyright-holder has the right to alter a work, although this may be the 
"logical implication of the statutory scheme."176 Congress, in enacting 
the 1976 Copyright Act, did not express its intention regarding such con-
flicts as it did its intention to eliminate equivalent state rights. Con-
gress's intent to preempt conflicting state rights is drawn from its stated 
intent to establish a "uniform national copyright system."177 
The conflict issue arose under the 1909 Copyright Act 178 in the case 
of Morseburg v. Balyon. 179 Upholding the state legislation, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "[t]he cru-
cial inquiry is not whether state law .reaches matters also subject to fed-
eral regulation, but whether the two laws function harmoniously rather 
than discordantly."18o 
This finding by the court that no conflict in fact existed between 
state and federal law has been criticized. 181 It should be noted, however, 
that the court recognized that the Supreme Court's emphasis in applying 
the doctrine of preemption has varied from time to time from being, "ap-
plied with nationalistic fervor"182 to " ... periods with generous tolerance 
of state involvement in areas already to some extent the subject of na-
tional concem."183 The Court's position on preemption is to a large ex-
tent influenced by "the area of law in which the issue arises."184 For 
example, in dealing with foreign affairs the emphasis will be on national 
interest, and conflict will be easily found. When dealing with artists' 
rights, however, the court of appeals predicted that the Supreme Court 
would shift the emphasis in favor of state legislation.18s In making this 
174. Francione, supra note 143, at 140. 
175. [d. at 139. 
176. [d. at 142. But see Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 
1976) (discussed supra note 14). 
177. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1976). 
178.17 U.S.c. §§ 1-27 (1970). 
179. 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980). 
180. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 978. 
181. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 8.22[B), at 8-272.6 -8-272.8. 
182. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 976. 
183. [d. at 976 (citing Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federal-
ism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975)). 
184. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 976. 
185. [d. at 977. 
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prediction, the court of appeals looked to the Supreme Court's attitude 
toward artists' rights as shown in Goldstein v. California. 186 There, the 
Supreme Court upheld a California statute making it a criminal offense 
to "pirate" recordings, an activity against which the copyright-holder 
had no protection. 187 In reviewing Goldstein the court of appeals in Mor-
seburg deduced that " ... the interests of California in particular and of 
federalism in general were given emphasis."lss 
The problem of possible conflict between MAPA and federal law 
can be overcome by adding language to MAP A making it clear that the 
written explicit transfer of these copyrights amounts to a waiver of rights 
under MAPA. 189 Mere sale of an art work, however, does not automati-
cally transfer the copyright. In such cases the artist would retain his 
MAP A rights. 
If the 1976 Copyright Act is amended in accordance with the Ken-
nedy proposal,190 MAPA clearly will be preempted. The Kennedy pro-
posal would add to the 1976 Copyright Act the same sort of moral rights 
of paternity and integrity granted by MAPA. The proposed amendment 
explicitly states that it grants rights "[i]ndependently of the artist's eco-
nomic right in copyright. ... "191 In fact, the Kennedy proposal goes 
further than MAPA in that it would not only grant artists rights of pa-
ternity and integrity, but would also give an artist, or in the case of his 
death, the National Endowment for the Arts, a right to royalties on each 
resale of the art work for fifty years beyond his death. 192 
In some ways, the proposed Kennedy amendment runs counter to 
what one would expect to find in the 1976 Copyright Act. For example, 
the artist's right to receive a royalty on re-sale cannot be waived although 
the artist can assign the right to collect the royalty payment. 193 Also, as 
an amendment to federal legislation, the Kennedy proposal will not be 
subject to attack on preemption grounds, so it allows an artist to transfer 
copyright and still maintain the right to assert infringement of copyright 
for distortion, mutilation or other alteration. 194 
186. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
187. [d. at 571. 
188. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 977. 
189. In order to transfer a copyright there must be a writing signed by the owner of the 
rights conveyed. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1977). 
190. Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986, S. 2796, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (see 
Appendix II). 
191. Visual Artists Rights Amendment § 3 (adding subsection (b)(I) to title 17, section 
106 of the United States Code). 
192. This is based on the French "Droit de Suite." Emley, The Resales Royalties Act: 
Paintings, Preemption and Profit, 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 239, 240 n.9 (1978); 
Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection For the Underprivi-
leged Artist Under Copyright Law, 6 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'y 94 (1959). 
193. Visual Artists Rights Amendment § 3 (adding subsection (d)(I) to title 17, section 
106 of the United States Code). 
194. Visual Artists Rights Amendment § 3 (adding subsection (c) to title 17, section 106 
of the United States Code). 
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2. Due Process and the Contract Clause 
Other state statutes l95 conferring moral rights have been criticized 
as violating the Contract Clausel96 and the fourteenth amendment Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 197 A similar criticism 
may apply to MAPA. Section 2 of the proposed bill states that "this Act 
shall apply to any claim based on proscribed acts occurring on or after 
July 1, 1986 to any work of fine art whenever created."198 MAPA argua-
bly has a retroactive effect since a person who purchased a work before 
July 1, 1986 had certain rights in that work, including the right to alter 
the work, which the statute may take away in contravention of the Con-
tract Clause and without due process. 
The Contract Clause argument is the easiest to overcome. Not all 
impairments of contracts are improper under the Contract Clause. 199 
The Supreme Court has held that "[s]tates must possess broad power to 
adopt general regulatory measures without being concerned that private 
contracts will be impaired or even destroyed, as a result."2°O In Mor-
seburg, the court found the impairment of the contract insignificant and 
thus not in need of extensive justification that might otherwise be neces-
sary, noting that for the impairment of a contract right to violate the 
. Contract Clause, such impairment must be "severe, permanent, irrevoca-
ble and retroactive and which serves no broad, generalized economic or 
social purpose .... "201 The purpose of MAPA is stated to be the protec-
tion of the artist or the public, and the harm to the owner of the work 
will rarely be severe. 
The Due Process Clause raises two issues: (1) whether MAPA con-
stitutes a permissible exercise of the state's police power and (2) if so, 
whether compensation must be paid to the owner for the taking of these 
rights. MAPA should be viewed by the courts as a form of economic 
regulation to promote artistic endeavors generally. As such, it is the 
proper subject of legislation and "legislative Acts adjusting the burdens 
and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of 
constitutionality .. " [T]he burden is on one complaining of a due pro-
cess violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary 
and irrational way."202 In Morseburg, the court of appeals, reviewing 
195. See supra notes 101-104. 
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I. 
197. U.S. CONST. amend. V (applicable to states through U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). 
198. Maryland Art Preservation Act § 2. The reference to July I, 1986 will be changed 
to the year in which MAP A is passed. 
199. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 979 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980) 
(citing United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,22 (1977». 
200. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,22 (1977). 
201. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 979 (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 
234,250 (1978». 
202. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. I, IS (1976) (Federal Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act of 1969 held constitutional against a challenge by twenty-two 
coal mine operators). 
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state artist protection legislation, held that the state legislation was 
neither arbitrary nor capricious.203 
To some degree the state's interest in MAPA is an aesthetic one, 
although the State of Maryland may gain or lose economically by becom-
ing either more or less attractive to artists. Aesthetic considerations 
alone have been a sufficient basis for state action if they "bear substan-
tially on the economic, social and cultural patterns of a community or 
district."204 In light of the arguments asserted in favor of moral rights 
legislation in the United States and the experience of European countries 
and Berne Convention signatories, this test evidently is met. 
In Morseburg, the plaintiff also argued that the retroactivity of the 
state legislation removed it from the sphere of usual economic regula-
tion.20s To this argument the court responded that legislation which 
readjusted rights and burdens was not invalid solely because it upset 
otherwise settled expectations206 and that "[o]nly when such retroactive 
effects are so wholly unexpected and disruptive that harsh and oppressive 
consequences follow is the constitutional limitation exceeded."207 The 
state legislation was held not to have consequences of that magnitude,208 
and although MAP A would apply to any work of fine art whenever cre-
ated,209 MAP A will likely survive attack on this issue. 
The question remains whether the art-owner should be compensated 
for the state's taking of the rights of ownership by enactment of MAP A. 
Generally, the right of citizens to just compensation for property taken 
by the government is "designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole."210 In applying this policy 
courts have tended to take account of an owner's economic expectations 
as well as the severity of the diminution in the value of his property 
caused by the government's action and have weighed these against the 
public purpose served by the regulation.211 MAPA neither decreases the 
value of the artwork to the owner nor interferes with present use and 
enjoyment except to the extent that destruction, alteration or mutilation 
are not allowed. The owner's interest in destroying, altering, or mutilat-
ing artwork he owns is not likely to weigh very heavily against the public 
purpose served by the legislation. 
203. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 979. 
204. Gantz, supra note 5, at 899. 
205. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 979. 
206. Id. at 979-80. 
207. /d. at 980 (citing Hazelwood Chronic & Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Weinberger, 
543 F.2d 703, 708 (9th Cir. 1976». 
208. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 980. 
209. Maryland Art Preservation Act § 2. 
210. Gantz, supra note 5, at 900 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960». 
211. Gantz, supra note 5, at 900. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
MAP A is designed to create a receptive climate for artists working 
in Maryland. Such legislation is needed in those rare instances when art 
work and artists' reputations are threatened. In view of the potential for 
confusion when courts attempt to implement artists' rights through ex-
isting common law doctrines or federal statutory schemes, explicit state 
protection of moral rights is desirable. MAPA, with the changes recom-
mended in this article, can achieve that goal. 
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APPENDIX I 
SENATE OF MARYLAND 
61r1961 
SB 233/85 - JPR No. 458 
By: Senator Lapides 
Introduced and read first time: January 27, 1986 
Assigned to: Economic and Environmental Affairs 
[Vol. 17 
EXPLANATION: CAPITALS INDICATE MATTER ADDED TO 
EXISTING LAW. 
[Brackets] indicate matter deleted from existing law. 
A BILL ENTITLED 
AN ACT concerning 
Maryland Art Preservation Act 
FOR the purpose of providing for the protection of an artist or the public 
against the defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a work of 
fine art in the lawful possession of a person other than the artist; prohib-
iting any person, except an artist who owns and possesses a work of fine 
art of the artist's own creation, from intentionally committing or author-
izing another to intentionally commit, as specified, any physical deface-
ment, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a work of fine art; 
prohibiting any person who frames, conserves, restores, or sells a work of 
fine art from committing, or authorizing another to commit, any such 
acts by the use of negligence; permitting the artist to seek specified judi-
cial relief in a court action to enforce certain rights and duties; providing 
that the court action must be commenced within a prescribed period fol-
lowing the proscribed action or its discovery, whichever is longer; pro-
viding that the enforcement of prescribed rights and duties by the artist 
or the artist's heir, legatee, or personal representative applies only to pro-
scribed action which takes place prior to a certain anniversary of the 
artist's death; providing for exceptions; providing that this Act applies 
only to acts of physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction 
occurring on or after a certain date regardless of the date of creation of 
the work affected thereby; providing that the provisions of this Act are 
severable; and generally relating to the protection of any work of fine art 
in the State. 
BY adding to 
Article 41 - Governor - Executive and Administrative 
Departments 
Section 404A through 404H to be under the new subtitle "36A 
Maryland Art Preservation Act" 
Annotated Code of Maryland 
(1982 Replacement Volume and 1985 Supplement) 
1987] )lrtists' Iti~ts 
Preamble 
91 
The General Assembly hereby finds and declares that the physical 
alteration or destruction of fine art, which is an expression of the artist's 
personality, is detrimental to the artist's reputation, and artists therefore 
have an interest in protecting their works of fine art against such altera-
tion or destruction; and that there is also a public interest in preserving 
the integrity of cultural and artistic creations; now, therefore, 
SECTION 1. BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEM-
BL Y OF MARYLAND, That the Laws of Maryland read as follows: 
Article 41 - Governor - Executive and Administrative 
Departments 
36A. MARYLAND ART PRESERVATION ACT 
404A. 
(A) IN THIS SUBTITLE THE FOLLOWING WORDS HAVE 
THE MEANINGS INDICATED. 
(B) "ARTIST" MEANS AN INDIVIDUAL WHO CREATES 
A WORK OF ART. 
(C) (1) "WORK OF FINE ART" MEANS AN ORIGINAL 
ART WORK OF RECOGNIZED QUALITY THAT IS: 
(I) A VISUAL RENDITION INCLUDING A PAINT-
lNG, DRAWING, SCULPTURE, MOSAIC, OR PHOTOGRAPH; 
(II) A WORK OF CALLIGRAPHY; 
(III) A WORK OF GRAPHIC ART, INCLUDING AN 
ETCHING, LITHOGRAPH, OFFSET PRINT, OR SILK SCREEN; 
(IV) A CRAFT WORK IN MATERIALS INCLUDING 
CLAY, TEXTILE, FIBER, WOOD, METAL, PLASTIC, OR GLASS; 
OR 
(V) A WORK IN MIXED MEDIA INCLUDING A COL-
LAGE OR A WORK CONSISTING OF ANY COMBINATION OF 
WORKS INCLUDED IN THIS SUBSECTION. 
(2) "WORK OF FINE ART" DOES NOT INCLUDE 
WORK PREPARED UNDER CONTRACT FOR COMMERCIAL 
USE BY ITS PURCHASER. 
(D) "PERSON" MEANS AN INDIVIDUAL, PARTNERSHIP, 
CORPORATION, ASSOCIATION, OR OTHER GROUP, HOW-
EVER ORGANIZED. 
(E) "FRAMER" MEANS A PERSON WHO PREPARES OR 
CAUSES TO BE PREPARED A WORK OF FINE ART FOR DIS-
PLAY IN A MANNER CUSTOMARILY CONSIDERED TO BE 
APPROPRIATE FOR A WORK OF FINE ART IN THE PARTICU-
LAR MEDIUM. 
(F) "RESTORER" MEANS A PERSON WHO RETURNS OR 
CAUSES TO BE RETURNED A DETERIORATED OR DAM-
AGED WORK OF FINE ART, AS NEARLY AS FEASIBLE, TO ITS 
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ORIGINAL STATE OR CONDITION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
PREVAILING STANDARDS. 
(G) "CONSERVATOR" MEANS A PERSON WHO PRE-
SERVES OR CAUSES TO BE PRESERVED A WORK OF FINE 
ART BY RETARDING OR PREVENTING DETERIORATION OR 
DAMAGE THROUGH APPROPRIATE TREATMENT, IN AC-
CORDANCE WITH PREVAILING STANDARDS, IN ORDER TO 
MAINTAIN THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TO THE FULLEST 
EXTENT POSSIBLE IN AN UNCHANGING STATE. 
(H) "ART DEALER" MEANS A PERSON WHO REGU-
LARL Y AND IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS 
SELLS, OR CAUSES TO BE SOLD, A WORK OF FINE ART CRE-
ATED BY AN ARTIST. 
(I) "COMMERCIAL USE" MEANS FINE ART CREATED 
UNDER A WORK-FOR-HIRE ARRANGEMENT FOR USE IN 
ADVERTISING, MAGAZINES, NEWSPAPERS, OR OTHER 
PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA. 
(J) "NEGLIGENCE" MEANS THE FAILURE TO EXERCISE 
REASONABLE CARE FOR THE PARTICULAR WORK OF FINE 
ART. 
404B. 
(A) EXCEPT AN ARTIST WHO OWNS AND POSSESSES A 
WORK OF FINE ART WHICH THE ARTIST HAS CREATED, A 
PERSON MAY NOT INTENTIONALLY COMMIT, OR AUTHOR-
IZE THE INTENTIONAL COMMISSION OF, ANY PHYSICAL 
DEFACEMENT, MUTILATION, ALTERATION, OR DESTRUC-
TION OF A WORK OF FINE ART. 
(B) IN ADDITION TO THE PROHIBITIONS CONTAINED 
IN SUBSECTION (A) OF THIS SECTION, A FRAMER, CONSER-
VATOR, RESTORER, OR DEALER OF A WORK OF FINE ART 
MAY NOT COMMIT, OR AUTHORIZE THE COMMISSION OF, 
ANY PHYSICAL DEFACEMENT, MUTILATION, ALTERATION, 
OR DESTRUCTION OF A WORK OF FINE ART BY ANY ACT 
CONSTITUTING NEGLIGENCE. 
404C. 
THE ARTIST SHALL RETAIN AT ALL TIMES THE RIGHT 
TO CLAIM AUTHORSHIP, AND TO RECEIVE PROPER CREDIT, 
OR FOR JUST AND VALID REASON, TO DISCLAIM AUTHOR-
SHIP OF THE ARTIST'S WORK OF FINE ART. 
404D. 
(A) TO EFFECTUATE THE RIGHTS CREATED BY THIS 
SUBTITLE, THE ARTIST MAY COMMENCE AN ACTION TO 
RECOVER OR OBTAIN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING: 
(1) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF; 
(2) ACTUAL DAMAGES; 
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(3) PUNITIVE DAMAGES; 
(4) REASONABLE ATTORNEY AND EXPERT WIT-
NESS FEES; OR 
(5) ANY OTHER RELIEF WHICH THE COURT DEEMS 
PROPER. 
(B) IF PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE AWARDED UNDER 
SUBSECTION (A) (3) OF THIS SECTION, THE COURT MAY SE-
LECT AN ORGANIZATION ENGAGED IN CHARITABLE OR 
EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES INVOLVING THE FINE ARTS IN 
MARYLAND TO RECEIVE SUCH DAMAGES. 
404E. 
IN DETERMINING WHETHER A WORK OF FINE ART IS 
OF RECOGNIZED QUALITY, THE TRIER OF FACT SHALL 
RELY ON THE OPINIONS OF ARTISTS, ART DEALERS, COL-
LECTORS OF FINE ART, CURATORS OF ART MUSEUMS, AND 
OTHER PERSONS INVOLVED WITH THE CREATION OR MAR-
KETING OF FINE ART. 
404F. 
THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES CREATED UNDER THIS 
SUBTITLE: 
(1) WITH RESPECT TO ANY ARTIST, OR IF ANY ARTIST 
IS DECEASED, THE ARTIST'S HEIR, LEGATEE, OR PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE, EXIST FOR 50 YEARS AFTER THE DEATH 
OF SUCH ARTIST; 
(2) SHALL EXIST IN ADDITION TO ANY OTHER RIGHTS 
AND DUTIES WHICH MAY NOW OR IN THE FUTURE BE AP-
PLICABLE; OR 
(3) EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 404G(A) OF THIS 
SUBTITLE MAY NOT BE WAIVED EXCEPT BY AN INSTRU-
MENT IN WRITING EXPRESSLY SO PROVIDING WHICH IS 
SIGNED BY THE ARTIST. 
404G. 
(A) (1) UNLESS THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES CREATED 
UNDER THIS SUBTITLE ARE EXPRESSLY RESERVED BY AN 
INSTRUMENT IN WRITING SIGNED BY THE OWNER OF A 
BUILDING AND PROPERLY RECORDED WITH THE CLERK 
OF THE COURT OF THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE BUILDING 
IS LOCATED, SUCH RIGHTS AND DUTIES SHALL BE WAIVED. 
IF THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING WISHES TO REMOVE A 
WORK OF FINE ART WHICH IS PART OF THE BUILDING 
AND THE WORK OF FINE ART CANNOT BE REMOVED 
WITHOUT: 
(I) UNREASONABLE EXPENSE; OR 
(II) SUBSTANTIAL PHYSICAL DEFACEMENT, MUTI-
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LATION, ALTERATION, OR DESTRUCTION OF THE WORK OF 
FINE ART. 
(2) THE INSTRUMENT IN WRITING REQUIRED UNDER 
PARAGRAPH (1) OF THIS SUBSECTION, IF PROPERLY RE-
CORDED, IS BINDING ON ANY SUBSEQUENT OWNER OF THE 
BUILDING. 
(B) (1) IF THE OWNER OF A BUILDING WISHES TO RE-
MOVE A WORK OF FINE ART WHICH IS A PART OF THE 
BUILDING AND WHICH CAN BE REMOVED AT REASON-
ABLE EXPENSE FROM THE BUILDING WITHOUT SUBSTAN-
TIAL HARM TO THE FINE ART, AND IN THE COURSE OF OR 
AFTER REMOVAL, THE OWNER INTENDS TO CAUSE OR AL-
LOW THE FINE ART TO SUFFER PHYSICAL DEFACEMENT, 
MUTILATION, ALTERATION, OR DESTRUCTION, THE 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES CREATED UNDER THIS SUBTITLE AP-
PLY UNLESS: 
(I) THE OWNER HAS DILIGENTLY ATTEMPTED WITH-
OUT SUCCESS TO NOTIFY THE ARTIST, OR IF THE ARTIST IS 
DECEASED, THE ARTIST'S HEIR, LEGATEE OR PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE IN WRITING AND BY PERSONAL SER-
VICE OR CERTIFIED MAIL OF THE OWNER OF THE BUILD-
ING'S INTENDED ACTION AFFECTING THE WORK OF FINE 
ART; OR 
(II) THE OWNER PROVIDED NOTICE AND THE PERSON 
SO NOTIFIED FAILED WITHIN 90 DAYS AFTER THE NOTICE 
EITHER TO REMOVE THE WORK OR TO PAY FOR ITS 
REMOVAL. 
(2) IF ANY WORK OF ART IS REMOVED FROM ANY 
BUILDING BY OR AT THE EXPENSE OF THE ARTIST OR THE 
ARTIST'S HEIR, LEGATEE, OR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
UNDER PARAGRAPH (1) OF THIS SUBSECTION, TITLE TO 
THAT WORK OF FINE ART PASSES TO THAT PERSON. 
(C) NOTHING IN THIS SECTION AFFECTS THE RIGHTS 
OF AUTHORSHIP CREATED IN SECTION 404C OF THIS 
SUBTITLE. 
404H. 
AN ACTION MAY NOT BE MAINTAINED TO ENFORCE 
ANY LIABILITY UNDER THIS SUBTITLE UNLESS BROUGHT 
WITHIN 3 YEARS OF THE ACT COMPLAINED OF OR 1 YEAR 
AFTER DISCOVERY OF THE ACT, WHICHEVER IS LONGER. 
SECTION 2. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That this Act 
shall apply to any claim based on proscribed acts occurring on or after 
July 1, 1986 to any work of fine art whenever created. 
SECTION 3. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That if any 
provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circum-
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stance is held invalid for any reason, the invalidity shall not affect the 
other provisions or any other application of this Act which can be given 
effect without the invalid provisions or application, and to this end all the 
provisions of this Act are declared to be severable. 
SECTION 4. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That this Act 
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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
[Vol. 17 
S.L.e. 
Mr. Kennedy introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
referred to the Committee on ---------------------
A BILL 
To amend the copyright law to secure the rights of artists of pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural works to prevent the distortion, mutilation, or 
other alteration of such works, to provide for resale royalties, and for 
other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be 
cited as the "Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986". 
Sec. 2. Section 101 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by--
(1) inserting between the paragraph defining "created" and the 
paragraph defining "derivative work" the following: 
"A 'critical embodiment' as applied to a work of fine art within the 
category of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works is one or more of (1) 
the only copy, e.g., a painting or a sculpture; (2) one of a specifically 
limited class of copies, e.g., one of a limited edition of fine prints; or (3) a 
master from which copies can be made, e.g., a mold or photographic 
nega ti ve. "; 
(2) inserting between the paragraph defining "pictorial works" and 
the paragraph defining "pseudonymous work", the following: 
" 'Price' as used herein, is the aggregate of all installments paid in 
cash or in-kind for a work."; 
(3) inserting between the paragraph defining "publicly" and the 
paragraph defining "sound recordings", the following: 
" 'Sale' and 'resale' as used herein, shall include transactions essen-
tially equivalent to a sale including long-term lease, lease-purchase ar-
rangements, and the like."; and 
(4) inserting between the paragraph defining "widow" and "wid-
ower" and the paragraph defining "work of the United States Govern-
ment", the following: . 
"A 'work of fine art' is a work of recognized fine art stature. In 
determining whether a work of fine art is of recognized quality, a court 
or other trier of fact may take into account the opinions of artists, art 
dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of art museums, restorers and con-
servators of fine art, and other persons involved with the creation, appre-
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ciation, history, or marketing of fine art. Evidence of commercial 
exploitation of a work as a whole or of particular copies, standing alone, 
does not preclude a finding that the work is a work of fine art.". 
Sec.3. Section 106 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by 
adding "(a)" before "Subject" at the beginning of the section and adding 
at the end thereof the following: 
"(b)(I) Independently of the artist's economic right in copyright in a 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work of fine art, the artist shall have the 
right during his life to claim authorship of his works which are publicly 
displayed or to disclaim authorship of such works because of any distor-
tion, mutilation, or other alteration thereof. This right shall not apply to 
works made pursuant to contract for trade or advertising use. 
"(2) Upon the death of an artist, his estate shall have the exclusive 
right, up to 50 years after his death, to exercise the rights granted to the 
artist in paragraph (1) of this subsection. 
"(c) Subject to the limitation in section 113( d), the destruction or 
significant or substantial distortion, mutilation, or other alteration to the 
critical embodiment or totality of a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work 
caused by an intentional act or by gross negligence is a violation of the 
exclusive rights of the copyright owner where the creator of the work is 
the copyright owner. Where the artist is not the copyright owner, he 
shall nonetheless have the exclusive right during his lifetime, and his es-
tate shall have the exclusive right for up to 50 years after his death, to 
assert infringement of the copyright by distortion, mutilation, or other 
alteration. 
"(d)(I) Whenever a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work is sold, 
the seller shall pay to the artist or to the artist's agent, a royalty. Where 
the artist is deceased at the time of the sale, and the sale occurs within 
fifty years after the death of the artist, such royalty shall be paid to the 
National Endowment for the Arts for use in the visual arts program. 
Such royalties shall be in addition to and not a substitute for, appropri-
ated funds for the Visual Arts Fellowship program. Such royalty shall be 
equal to 7 percent of the difference between the seller's purchase price 
and the sale price or the fair market value of any property received in 
exchange for the work. The right of the artist to receive this royalty may 
not be waived. An artist may assign the right to collect this royalty pay-
ment, provided however, such assignment shall not have the effect of cre-
ating a waiver prohibited by this subsection. Failure of a seller to pay the 
artist a royalty due under this section shall constitute an infringement of 
the copyright. 
"(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the following: 
"(A) The resale of a work for a gross sales price of less than $500, 
or in exchange for property with a fair market value of less than $500. 
"(B) The resale of a work for a gross sale price of less than 140 
percent of the purchase price paid by the seller. 
"(e) Any artist seeking royalty payments for the sale of his work 
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must register with the Copyright Office. The Register of Copyrights is 
directed to establish such registration procedures by regulation. 
"(f) All sales or other transfers of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
works by registered artists must be registered by the seller or transferor 
with the Copyright Office. The Register of Copyrights is directed to es-
tablish such registration procedures by regulation. For transfers involv-
ing sales or exchanges, such registration shall include the title of the 
work, name and address of the buyer and seller, the date of sale, the 
seller's purchase price, and the sale price or fair market value of any 
property received in exchange for the work. 
"(g) Failure of a transferor or a seller of a pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural work by a registered artist to register such transfer or sale with 
the Copyright Office shall constitute an infringement of copyright.". 
Sec. 4. Section 113 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end thereof the following: 
"(d)(I) If a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work of recognized 
quality cannot be removed from a building without distortion, mutila-
tion, or other alteration of such work, the artist's rights under subsec-
tions (b) and ( c) of section 1 06, unless expressly reserved by an 
instrument in writing signed by the owner of such building and properly 
recorded, in the applicable State real property registry for such building, 
prior to the installation of such work, shall be deemed waived. Such 
instrument, if recorded, shall be binding on subsequent owners of such 
building. 
"(2) If the owner of a building wishes to remove a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work of recognized quality which is a part of such 
building but which can be removed from the building without substantial 
harm to such work, the artist's rights under subsections (b) and (c) of 
section 106 shall apply unless the owner has diligently attempted without 
success to notify the artist, or, if the artist is deceased, his heir, legatee, or 
personal representative, in writing of his intended action affecting the 
work of fine art, or unless he did provide notice and that person failed 
within ninety days either to remove the work or to pay for its removal. If 
such work is removed at the expense of the artist, his heir, legatee, or 
personal representative, title to such work shall be deemed to be in such 
person.". 
Sec. 5. Section 401 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end thereof the following: 
"(d) The provisions of this section shall not apply to pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural works of fine art.". 
Sec. 6. The criminal penalties provided by section 506 of title 17, 
United States Code, shall not apply to infringement of the rights created 
in section 106 (b), (c), and (d) of such title. 
Sec. 7. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as 
are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. 
